Green: Traffic Victims. Tort Law and Insurance by Kimball, Spencer L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 6 
1959 
Green: Traffic Victims. Tort Law and Insurance 
Spencer L. Kimball 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, Torts Commons, and the 
Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Spencer L. Kimball, Green: Traffic Victims. Tort Law and Insurance, 57 MICH. L. REV. 933 (1959). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss6/16 
 
This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1959] RECENT BOOKS 933 
RECENT BOOKS 
TRAFFIC VICTIMS. Tort Law and Insurance. By Leon Green. Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1958. Pp. 128. $4. 
This provocative little book is based on the 1958 Rosenthal lectures, 
given at Northwestern University School of Law. Though little is new in 
this publication, for Professor Green and others have been writing and 
talking about the automobile accident problem for many years, it succeeds 
in putting the whole problem in perspective for the non-specialist in tort 
law. Essentially the book's thesis seems to be this: Originally tort law was 
based on a doctrine of strict liability keyed to the action of trespass; under 
the impact of increasing commercial activity and industrialization, negli-
gence law developed and protected infant business enterprise against 
burdensome liability by relieving the defendant of all liability for unin-
tended harms except those involving "fault," or blameworthiness of con-
duct; in the twentieth century an increasing concern for the individuals 
ground beneath the mechanical juggernaut is leading to a revision of tort 
law in the direction of strict rather than fault-based liability, so that the 
user of machines must pay for the harm he does; as yet this tougher-minded 
negligence law is too uncertain and complex to solve the problem of auto-
mobile accidents, even when accompanied by widespread automobile liabil-
ity insurance; thus a legislative solution is needed. The solution Professor 
Green proposes is compulsory motor vehicle comprehensive loss insurance, 
which would compensate injured persons irrespective of fault. 
The industrialization of society brought sweeping changes in the law, 
for a legal system adapted to an agrarian, stationary, status-oriented society 
is not suitable for the needs of an industrial, mobile, individualistic society. 
Thus earlier law puts excessive emphasis on the values of the status quo. 
Its property notions prevent change; its contract law is little developed. 
By the nineteenth century, however, public attitudes called for significant 
change. Protection of static property gave way to concern for enterprise; 
property was fully protected only if it was property in use. As Hurst put 
it in an earlier Rosenthal lecture, "We were concerned with protecting 
private property chiefly for what it could do; as one looks at the facts 
of cases and pays somewhat less attention to the sonorous language of ju-
dicial opinions, he is impressed that what we did in the name of vested 
rights had less to do with protecting holdings than it had to do with pro-
tecting ventures. There is no key instance where vested rights doctrine 
protected a simple rentier interest."1 
The law of torts, too, responded to the change in the environment. 
Strict tort liability was consistent with the basic patterns of the older 
1 HURST, LAW AND THE CoNDmONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED 
STATES 24 (1956). 
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society. "One must use his own so as not to injure another, and if he does 
injure him he must show himself utterly without fault." But as enterprise 
became more important than status quo, the tort of negligence developed. 
The doctrines of negligence fitted the aggressive, enterprising, changing 
nineteenth century milieu better than did the stricter liability of trespass, 
for it relieved enterprise from excessive risk. The result was a doctrine 
that required "fault" for tort liability; the underlying basis of liability 
became a "moral" one. It is one of the merits of Green's book to point out 
that the real basis for the new tort law was not "morality," but the needs 
of infant enterprise, or if morality then the morality of the industrial 
revolution. The change was coincident with increase in traffic on the high-
ways; "horse and buggy" cases constituted the anvil on which the new law 
was hammered out. If the old basis of liability had continued, the business 
man would have put his fortune at risk whenever he went on the highway 
with a load of merchandise. The new doctrine eliminated that potential 
liability in the absence of "fault." Enterprise could not pay for the harm 
it caused, charging it off in the price of its product, because (1) enterprise 
was largely individual, and very modestly capitalized, so that a single large 
damage suit might bankrupt- the entrepreneur, and (2) the insurance 
devices for protecting him against this eventuality were far in the future. 
Thus the law accommodated itself to the apparent needs and capacities 
of social organization, and relieved the entrepreneur of certain adventitious 
costs so that he did not have to take account of them in his pricing. Harms 
that we would regard as a proper part of the cost of doing business were 
thus left to lie where they fell. In a sense, the injured individual was sacri-
ficed on the altar of collective need, i.e., the hapless individual subsidized a 
supposedly dynamic and fearless enterprise. 
One can recognize the need for this result at one stage in the evolution 
of our society without approving it in principle. Indeed, in our modern 
view, this subsidy collected from unwilling individuals was immoral. Most 
of us today give at least lip service to the proposition that these "social" 
costs of private enterprise should be brought into the cost accounting 
process of the entrepreneur and passed on to the consumer through the 
pricing mechanism-at least this is announced public policy in all the ad-
vanced capitalist nations.2 The merits of this change in social .practice have 
long been obscured by the effective use of pejorative terms to describe it. 
At least since Dicey3 it has been customary to talk of the nineteenth century 
as an age of individualism; and to speak of the developments of the 
twentieth century as collectivist. The development of administrative tri-
2 For a full discussion of this whole idea, see KAPP, THE SocIAL Cosrs OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE (1950). 
3 DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN _LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 
DURING THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY (1905). 
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bunals has been decried as "Bureaucracy Triumphant,"4 and government 
protection of hapless individuals against the machine as "The Road to 
Serfdom."5 These developments may have their dangers, which it is not 
the province of this book review to explore, but there is much merit in 
Green's suggestion that the appellation "collectivist" is misused. For it was 
in the nineteenth century that the injured individual was sacrificed to the 
collective need-to the desire of society for more and cheaper goods, and 
for successful enterprise, while it is in the twentieth century that the dignity 
and worth of the individual is better recognized and protected. No longer 
can the unemployed or injured workman be casually cast upon the in-
dustrial scrapheap and left to bear alone the accidental costs of the in-
dustrial machine. 
This drastic change in social attitudes has produced elaborate schemes 
of social insurance; it is also having its effect through a massive subterra-
nean movement to alter the conformations of negligence law-to return 
tort liability for injury back to a stricter form, not based on fault. 
Two factors are important in causing this reversion. For one thing, 
business itself has developed a sound method for converting risk into cost-
a highly developed and enterprising insurance business will sell insurance 
coverage protecting against almost any liability for harm done to others. 
Even without insurance, the risk to enterprise of a stricter tort liability 
would be less, for the enormous modern corporation can easily convert risk 
into cost through self-insurance. Perhaps more important than the possi-
bility of insurance, however, are the ravages of the motor car. This lethal 
weapon, which some years since killed its millionth victim, poses a problem 
of incredible proportions. A social problem so dramatic and pervasive calls 
for drastic solutions, and even scholars generally unsympathetic to a depar-
ture from fault orientation for tort law may concede that the "sheer bulk of 
the automobile accident problem is such that unusual measures are 
suggested."6 
Professor Green feels that "the courts are powerless to reconstruct a 
rational process for general use." The elaboration of doctrine and the 
general resistance of the litigation process to change make it likely that 
the court will not solve the problem posed by the slaughter on the high-
ways. Others would go farther and, adhering strictly to the received notions 
of stare decisis, deny to the courts the right to make the change, even if 
they could do so. 
Many suggestions have been made for legislative solution of the prob-
lem. A compensation scheme akin to workmen's compensation would re-
4 All.EN, BUREAUCRACY TRIUMPHANT (1931). 
5 HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
6 Cooperrider, "A Comment on The Law of Torts," 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291 at 1302 
(1958). 
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move the automobile problem from the sphere of negligence litigation, 
recognizing the irrelevance of fault where fault is almost impossible to 
assess. This scheme would not seek to redress wrong but to distribute 
risk. The compensation proposal has been in the mill for several decades, 
but despite repeated introduction in state legislatures, it is still untried 
in the United States. Less drastic is compulsory insurance as a prerequisite 
to automobile registration. Massachusetts adopted it thirty years ago, but 
was alone until New York recently followed suit, after insurance company 
opposition was weakened by intra-industry disagreement. Financial or 
safety responsibility laws are almost universal; these laws compel unsuccess-
ful defendants or persons who have been involved in accidents to buy 
insurance. They also induce most other persons to do so. 
If what is desired is to assure persons injured on the highways that 
they will not have to bear alone the accidental costs of motorized trans-
port, the difficulty with all these proposals, save only the compulsory com-
pensation system, is that insurance remains tied to the unwieldy lawsuit 
for negligence. Of course the pervasiveness of insurance does make it likely 
that the defendant can pay a judgment without serious harm to him; 
insurance thus creates a solid basis for reconstruction, if the courts wish, 
of a stricter form of tort liability. But Green thinks such a reconstruction is 
beyond their powers. 
Even if the courts could reconstruct tort law, there is much to be said 
for legislative intervention, for the solution can then be limited to auto-
mobile accidents. Where "fault" can be more readily ascertained, there 
may be strong arguments for preservation of a fault-based system.7 
Professor Green proposes compulsory motor vehicle comprehensive 
loss insurance, as an incident to the licensing of a motor vehicle. It differs 
from the compulsory insurance proposal mentioned above in insuring the 
loss of the injured person rather than the liability of the tort-feasor. This 
makes the proposal for compulsory insurance more rational and self-con-
sistent, for the reason for compelling insurance is the protection of injured 
third persons. It makes little sense, then, to filter that protection through a 
fault screen. Compulsory loss insurance would protect the injured person 
directly, without the intervention of negligence doctrines, though it would 
remain a court-administered system. Professor Ehrenzweig's similar pro-
posal of "full-aid" insurance would also eliminate the fault screen.8 
It is beyond the purpose of this book review to examine the proposal 
in more detail. That is the province of a more ambitious literary under-
taking. Perhaps it is sufficient to say, by way of conclusion, that Professor 
Green has added a useful and provocative piece to the growing literature 
which is concerned with reconstructing the field of tort law to serve the 
7 See, e.g., Cooperrider, "A Comment on The Law of Torts," 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291 
(1958). 
8 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954). 
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needs of twentieth century society. It is to be hoped that much more 
attention will be given to this problem, not only by scholars, but also 
(and more important) by legislators and their advisers. 
Spencer L. Kimball, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
